by Morris Kyder Westbridge
August 24, 2001
On October 23, 1759, Gen. James Wolfe, faced with the rapid approach of a St. Lawrence winter, bundled up his troops and fleet and set sail for New England, lifting the siege of Quebec and losing the greatest opportunity the British ever had to wrest Canada from the French. Never again would British arms be furnished with such a chance to secure the American frontier, and alone determine the future of a continent.
Few Britons today, least of all those in British America, are not aware of the siege and the generalities of it. Much less widely-known is just how close a thing it actually was. When Wolfe began landing his troops in the darkness before dawn on Sept. 13, 1759, General Montcalm was not even at Quebec. Had Wolfe's troops been able to aspire to the heights, to gather on broad plain outside the city walls, they would have met a force inferior in numbers and without its commander. This, combined with the effects of the siege, arguably might have delivered Quebec and the whole of dependent Canada into British hands. Even if the French fleet had arrived first in the spring, they would have faced the British well-entrenched, with very little time to dislodge them before the arrival of the British fleet. Had Wolfe's landing been even partially successful, the world might be a very different place today.
But history tells us that Wolfe's initiative was a hasty gamble taken in the face of bad weather, and beset with troubles from the start. The autumn rains had come early, making the approaches to the city, up a narrow path from the river to the ridge above, a dubious climb, even if his troops had managed to secure them. But as fate would have it, they were met with a French sentry. Reports tell us that a quick-thinking Scottish soldier, who had served in Belgium and thus had acquired serviceable French, actually half-convinced the sentry by claiming to be a member of a regiment he knew to be away from the city at the time. Had the sentry accepted that proof, he could have been overpowered and the approach to Quebec would have been open. But, he did not. Fatefully, the sentry demanded the watchword, and the ruse was discovered. That wise sentry lost his life in raising the alarm, but raise it he did, and the British never ascended the heights to the city above. Their advance beaten back, they languished aboard their fleet for another month, before finally giving up and sailing home.
Some experts have argued that the build-up that followed in 1760 and the years after demonstrate the French determination to hold onto their American empire; that losing Quebec would only have meant they would have returned in force to recover it. Others suggest that the loss of Quebec, combined with the loss of Fortress Louisbourg in 1758, would have been the last straw for a French regime weary of the interminable contest for America, and they would have cut their losses and left everything east of the Mississippi in the hands of the British. We will never know. The deliverance of Quebec from such a near thing was seen by the French as a sign from God that they had a future on the American continent. It rejuvenated their waning interest in New France and fired their pride and determination to extend the French kingdom across the vast empty expanses as yet unexplored by Europeans. Inspired by an almost religious fervour, tens of thousands of Frenchmen swelled the numbers of New France over the next several years, and the St. Lawrence River became an extension of the English Channel, two nations ever watchful for any sign of weakness in the other as they extended themselves ever westward, checking one another at every point.
What would America have been like had Wolfe taken Quebec in September, 1759? Is it out of the question to suppose that all of New France might have been ceded to Britain, and that we might today enjoy hegemony upon this continent? What would that have meant for the Empire and the Union? Would there have been a Union?
Many, even most, analysts agree that the conquest of New France by the British would have been complete with the fall of Quebec, or at least within their grasp. France's position in America would have become untenable; a fight to recover what they had lost without a foothold from which to launch the campaign. What would a British Canada have been like? Some scholars have speculated that the government would have resettled the population elsewhere, or even deported it back to France. Such notions are not completely dismissible; the entire European population of New France at the time was probably not over one hundred thousand. To scatter such people throughout the Empire or remove them completely would have been a task indeed, but hardly out of the question in light of France's efforts to populate New France over the next two decades, which saw the colonies' aggregate population soar to well over a million by 1780. To be sure, it was an effort that caused strain in France both at home and overseas, and nearly bankrupted the King and the government; but that it secured the French fact in America is beyond dispute. A much lesser effort would have emptied a British Canada, and opened the land to English-speaking settlers. Had Wolfe succeeded in his gamble, the English language might today ring out from friendly ports on both sides of the Great Lakes, and along both shores of the St. Lawrence River. Even without deportations, we can imagine without much fear of contradiction that a British Canada, with so thin a French population, would eventually have succumbed to the forces of assimilation in terms of language, law, religion, and custom.
What would the conquest of New France have meant to the British Empire? Here, answers are less certain. Some analysts suggest that it would have demoralized France and offered Britain a freer hand around the world. Others suggest it would only have doubled France's determination to check Britain's advance elsewhere, particularly in India and Africa. The resources thrown by France into securing New France during and after the Eleven Years' War would tend to support the latter view. France was by no means down and out in 1759 or afterward, and in the face of the loss of America, almost certainly would have concentrated her efforts elsewhere. Arguably, applying such effort to maintain her presence in America may have limited France's effectiveness in her struggles with Britain and Spain elsewhere in the world.
Perhaps the most enigmatic question of all is how the conquest of New France would have impacted the Union of British States. The founding of the Union followed Wolfe's adventure by six years. It is a matter of historical fact that the imperial government in London allowed its American colonies to form a confederal union in order for them, at least temporarily, to assume some of the responsibility for their own defence. Obviously, this impetus would not have existed in 1765 if the French threat had been eliminated by 1760. Some commentators have suggested that the threat from Indian nations, whose economic and political status would have been in flux in the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the French from America, would have provided the cause instead, but this seems doubtful, since the various Indian nations, while fearsome, typically posed local threats, and were driven by considerations of commerce and holding onto their lands, rather than actually conquering British North America. Only France and Spain posed such a threat, and with the elimination of France as one of them, the heart of the argument that created the Union would have been cut out. The confederation of Britain's American colonies would have come much later in history, or perhaps not at all. It is not beyond the realm of imagination to suppose that they might have evolved into completely separate, if related, countries. Perhaps most crucial of all, the machinery of government that assumed the stewardship of the Empire at the end of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic would not have been in place at that critical moment in history, and the British Empire itself might have dissolved, or been snatched up piecemeal by other empires.
These are the evidence produced. But finally the question "What would have been the results of a British victory at Quebec in 1759?" having been asked, must be answered. Based upon trends of the time, one may project the following course of history.
Assuming that Wolfe's forces had ascended to the Plains of Abraham and subsequently defeated the French force in Quebec, they would have secured the town and waited for relief and reinforcements to arrive in the spring. Very likely, the populace would have settled into the occupation, making the best of it with a wait-and-see attitude with regard to whose forces would arrive first in the spring. The French arriving first, there might have been a similar battle to recover Quebec. The British arriving first would have meant almost certain annexation of the colony, or at least its occupation for several years until it might possibly have been returned to France as part of the peace.
Assuming that the British fleet had arrived first, or that any French fleet were rebuffed, it is unlikely that the British would have returned New France to the dominion of the French, except under the direst of circumstances. For American Britons, who had participated in the capture of Louisbourg 1745 only to see it returned to France in 1748 — requiring its recapture in 1758 — and for whom the continued existence of New France and her Indian allies represented the greatest threat to peace and security, such a move would have been the signal for revolt and civil war. The British, having taken New France, would have kept it.
The results would have been immediate. British customs at the time would have meant that the use of the French language and practice of the Catholic religion in New France would have been severely curtailed in any capacity beyond daily living. The language of law and government would have been English. No Catholic — or at least, very few —would have expected to ever hold office in the administration of the newly-British colonies that had been New France.
Undoubtedly, British colonists from New York and New England would have moved in large numbers into the largely-empty lands of New France and played a large part in shaping those lands thereafter, bringing with them the English language, the Protestant religion, and British presumptions about government and jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the French culture, such as it existed before the Eleven Year's War, would have persisted long or vigorously. It is safe to assume that it would have effectively been eclipsed by the turn of the century, or not long afterward. The costly battles of the 1770s to secure a defensible border between New England and New France would not have been necessary, and the St. Lawrence River today might be a state boundary instead of an international one.
The founding of the Union on Franklin's plan in 1765 would probably have not come about. It is important to state that the Union was seen at the time as a response to the growing threat of a revitalized New France, and a temporary one at that (limited to six years, initially, and later extended by legislation). Even at that, the American colonies were hardly unanimous in their enthusiasm for the idea of a confederation; despite the huge threat that New France posed, it was most of a decade before the majority of the colonies acceded to the Union. To say that the colonies prized their independence and looked upon one another with jealousy is almost an understatement. Removing the danger of New France would have rendered those forces insurmountable for generations more, possibly forever.
Thus, the British Isles would have faced the French occupation of the 1790s with only scattered, factious colonies of little help on the other side of the Atlantic. It is doubtful that such a disorganized array of governments could have mounted the effort that the Union of British States, then nearly thirty years old, mustered in relief of the Mother Country. But this presupposes that the French invasion was inevitable. France assumed that New France would serve to pin down American Britons enough to keep them at home and out of the European aspect of the war, and was very nearly correct in that regard; as it was, three years went by before the UBS could render England and Wales any serious aid. Without New France on side, however, it is arguable that France would never have attempted an invasion of Britain, and would have concentrated it efforts purely on the Continent. Here the ramifications become colossal. Without the French invasion, it is highly unlikely that King Frederick would taken the bold moves he did to cripple Parliament and rule absolutely, in the style of King Louis. Consequently, the British monarchy might have avoided abolition and survived much longer than it did, possibly even to the present day, as witnessed by the continued existence of the French monarchy and peerage. The Union of British States would not have become the government of the whole Empire. Instead of being a republic ruled by a Congress in Franklin, the British Union might today still be a monarchy, ruled by a Parliament in London —or at least until such time as the American part of the Empire had outstripped the British Isles in terms of commerce and population.
It has been remarked that had it succeeded, Wolfe's conquest of Quebec would have resulted in the largest transfer of territory in world history. It's clear that there would have been many other consequences for America and the rest of the world as well. Had James Wolfe succeeded, we would not be living in the world in which we live today. Whether the world would have been a better or a worse place as a result is not for us to say with any certainty; only that it would have been very different.